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Abstract 
 
In order to improve the quality of embedded 
software, this paper proposes an enhancement to the 
ESIM (Embedded Systems Improving Method) by 
combining an IFD (Information Flow Diagram) with 
an Analysis Matrix to analyze unexpected obstacles in 
the software. These obstacles are difficult to predict in 
the software specification. Recently, embedded systems 
have become larger and more complicated. 
Theoretically therefore, the development cycle of these 
systems should be longer. On the contrary, in practice 
the cycle has been shortened. This trend in industry 
has resulted in the oversight of unexpected obstacles, 
and consequently affected the quality of embedded 
software. In order to prevent the oversight of 
unexpected obstacles, we have already proposed two 
methods for requirements analysis: the ESIM using an 
Analysis Matrix and a method that uses an IFD. In 
order to improve the efficiency of unexpected obstacle 
analysis at reasonable cost, we now enhance the ESIM 
by combining an IFD with an Analysis Matrix. The 
enhancement is studied from the following three 
viewpoints. First, a conceptual model comprising both 
the Analysis Matrix and IFD is defined. Then, a 
requirements analysis procedure is proposed, that uses 
both the Analysis Matrix and IFD, and assigns each 
specific role to either an expert or non-expert engineer. 
Finally, to confirm the effectiveness of this 
enhancement, we carry out a description experiment 
using an IFD.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Embedded systems are used by various users who are 
unaware of the existence of the systems in different 
environments [1], [2]. Furthermore, these systems are 
required to provide a safe, reliable service over a long 
period. As a result, 70% or more of the source code of 
embedded systems is generally allocated to exception 
handling. It is expected that as embedded systems grow 
larger in scale and become more complicated [3], the 
development cycle would lengthen. On the contrary, in 
reality this development cycle has actually shortened, 
with the result that it has become more difficult to take 
into account all the exception conditions. Furthermore, 
software engineers are required to have knowledge not 
only of the software, but also of devices, users and 
environments to be able to recognize exception 
conditions in the embedded software [4]. Occasionally 
however, software engineers do overlook exception 
conditions expected at times. In fact, the failure of 
products occurs mainly because exception conditions 
have not been foreseen and a re-design of the software 
becomes necessary. This means that we can expect to 
improve the quality and productivity of the embedded 
software by reflecting the exception conditions more 
accurately in the specification. 
 
Fig. 1.  Example of an IFD
We call these exception conditions “unexpected 
obstacles” and have studied requirements analysis 
methods to prevent overlooking unexpected obstacles 
in embedded systems [5], [6], [7], [8]. In this paper, the 
term “expected specifications” specifies the usual 
system behavior described in the software operation 
manual and explicitly defined at the start of the 
architectural design, whereas “unexpected obstacle 
specifications” are concerned with any deviations from 
the usual behavior. Examples of such deviations are 
fading and failure of system hardware, incorrect 
operation and overload caused by system users, and 
temperature or radio noise in the natural environment. 
Of course, the unexpected obstacle specifications 
should also be explicitly defined in the system 
specifications.  However, they are referred to as 
"unexpected obstacle specifications" throughout the 
entire system development process, in order to 
distinguish them from the expected specifications, and 
because they are sometimes left undefined. 
We have studied two analysis methods for 
unexpected obstacles by formalizing a method that is 
tacitly used by experts in embedded software 
development. We have already proposed using an 
Information Flow Diagram (IFD) in one of the methods 
[6]. In the other method, which we call ESIM, we 
proposed the use of an Analysis Matrix [7]. Compared 
with other existing analysis methods [4], [9], [10], [11], 
[12], [13], these methods incorporate both top-down 
and bottom-up analysis approaches to prevent 
overlooking unexpected obstacles. Until now, it has 
been assumed that these two methods are used 
separately. However, if we combine them to form a 
new method, we can expect the cost-effectiveness of 
analyzing unexpected obstacles accruing to each of the 
two methods according to the experiments. In this 
paper, we therefore propose an enhancement to ESIM 
by combining an IFD with an Analysis Matrix. 
In Section 2, we describe briefly an IFD, the ESIM 
and the requirements for the enhancement. In Section 3, 
we propose the enhancement to the ESIM. Section 4 
discusses the enhancement. Our conclusions are 
presented in Section 5. 
 
2. IFD, ESIM and requirements 
 
We first give a brief description of an IFD and the 
ESIM. Then, we specify the requirements for the 
enhancement. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Example of an Analysis Matrix
 
2.1. An IFD 
 
An IFD is composed of two diagrams, the Process 
Diagram (PD) and the Device Diagram (DD), and the 
connections between these diagrams. The PD 
represents the processes in the embedded system and 
the information flow between them. The DD represents 
the devices in the embedded system, the objects, such 
as users, in the operational environment and the 
communication carriers between them. Fig. 1 shows an 
example of an IFD. The upper and lower parts are 
separated by a dotted line, and specify the PD and DD 
respectively. 
When we analyze unexpected obstacles with an IFD, 
we can logically trace the causal relation of the failure 
from the causes to the final result in the IFD. For 
example, a failure scenario is outlined by the numbered 
sequence (1), (2), (3), etc. in the figure. Because of the 
traceability, non-expert engineers can analyze 
unexpected obstacles under the leadership of expert 
engineers. However, much information about devices, 
carriers, processes and information flows needs to be 
specified in the IFD. 
 
2.2. ESIM and an Analysis Matrix 
 
The ESIM is composed of two phases: device 
failure extracting phase and failure scenario 
constructing phase. In the former phase, by applying 
guide words, we assume unexpected phenomena to be 
deviations from the component functions. Then, we 
extract component device failures from the unexpected 
phenomena by applying FTA. In the latter phase, we 
extract unexpected states or events by analyzing the 
unexpected phenomena, and add these states or events 
to the Analysis Matrix, an example of which  is given 
in Fig. 2. New unexpected phenomena may occur 
because of the added states or events. This procedure is 
repeated until no new unexpected phenomena are 
discovered, and we can then construct the failure 
scenarios that are often overlooked by the software 
engineers during the requirements analysis and design 
phases. 
ESIM has two characteristics. One is that we can 
find unexpected states and events which are overlooked 
by the software design engineers. The other is that we 
extend the Analysis Matrix from which we can easily 
obtain all the combinations of states and events. 
However, only expert engineers can use the ESIM in 
practice since the granularity of the information 
contained in the Analysis Matrix is coarser than that in 
the IFD. However, the ESIM requires less information 
to be specified than for the IFD. 
 
2.3. Requirements 
 
By experimenting with the ESIM and an IFD, we 
obtained the above-mentioned results, which show that 
the characteristics of each method are contradictory. 
With regard to engineer skills, only expert engineers 
can use the ESIM, whereas analysis by non-expert 
engineers using an IFD only requires leadership from 
expert engineers. Regarding the quantity of information 
to be specified, an IFD needs more 
 
Fig. 3.  Conceptual Model of Requirement Analysis Objects 
 
information than the ESIM. This means, of course, that 
the ESIM is more efficient than an IFD in analyzing 
unexpected obstacles although relying on expert 
engineers is more costly than using non-expert 
engineers. 
In practice, it is difficult for a project manager to 
find several expert engineers. On the other hand, it is 
not difficult to obtain non-expert engineers. Therefore, 
we propose a cost-effective analysis method operable 
by a team of expert and non-expert engineers, by 
combining an IFD with the ESIM. In this method, 
expert engineers lead non-expert engineers by using the 
ESIM and IFD respectively. 
 
3. Enhancing ESIM by combining IFD 
with Analysis Matrix 
 
In this section, we propose an enhancement to the 
ESIM. We start with a conceptual model of an 
embedded system, which we call the “Basic Conceptual 
Model”. We then add to this basic model the concepts 
that expert engineers use for understanding embedded 
systems, and call this the “Additional Model”. 
Thereafter, we propose an enhancement to the ESIM 
by combining an IFD with an Analysis Matrix in order 
to satisfy the requirements specified in Section 2.3. 
 
3.1. Conceptual Model of Requirement 
Analysis Objects 
 
Fig. 3 shows the conceptual model of requirement 
analysis objects when expert engineers analyze 
unexpected obstacles in embedded systems. This model 
is separated into two parts by the horizontal line. The 
upper part of the model shows the basic conceptual 
model. These concepts are considered by the engineers 
during the design phase of the expected specifications. 
However, when the engineers design unexpected 
obstacle specifications, they introduce new concepts. 
The lower part of the model shows the additional 
model. The concepts in the additional model have the 
following meanings: 
• Normal State (Expected State) means a state that 
is defined in the expected specifications. 
• Abnormal State (Unexpected State) means a state 
that is not defined in the expected specifications. 
Thus the Abnormal States consist, not only of fatal 
failures such as out of component works, but also of 
irregular states, such as processing overloads. 
• Normal Event (Expected Event) means an event 
that is defined in the expected specifications. 
• Abnormal Event (Unexpected Event) means an 
event that is not defined in the expected 
specifications. For example, it may be classified as 
a normal event when a motor transmits power to 
another  component. However, assume that the 
motor makes a noise at the same time. If software 
engineers do not take this into consideration, it is 
classified as an abnormal event. 
• Failure Carrier specifies a carrier that has an 
irregular value because of the effects of some 
phenomenon. If a carrier of this kind reaches a 
destination component, the information process of 
the component will not understand the original 
meaning. An example of a failure carrier is an 
irregular voltage signal caused by a short in the 
signal line. 
• State of the System addresses the entire state, 
including environment. We note that this definition 
is different from the general definition of the state 
of the system, which is usually defined as the 
Cartesian product of the states of all components at 
a particular moment. In our definition, however, it 
is defined as the Cartesian product of the states of 
those components on which the analysis is focused. 
• Phenomenon addresses the phenomenon that 
occurs by combining the states of the system, even 
as defined above. The occurrence of the 
phenomenon means that there is a transition of the 
states of some components and/or sending events. 
This is shown as a dependency in the conceptual 
model of the requirement analysis objects. 
• Expected Phenomenon addresses a phenomenon 
judged not to become a failure or to cause a failure 
in the system or environment. 
• Unexpected Phenomenon addresses a 
phenomenon that is a failure in the system or 
environment or the cause of such a failure. 
• Scenario means an ordered information flow or 
ordered phenomena and has meaning, which is 
given by a constraint. 
• Failure Scenario addresses a scenario that results 
in failure. 
Expert engineers analyze unexpected obstacles 
using either a top-down analysis like FTA [9], a 
bottom-up analysis like FMEA [10] or deflection 
analysis like HAZOP [11]. We now show how each of 
these analyses is carried out on the conceptual model.  
FTA is used to analyze the causes of the failure 
specified at the root of a tree; it proceeds from the root 
to the leaves in a stepwise manner. In the conceptual 
model, we show two top-down analyses like FTA. One 
of these is an analysis method in which engineers 
specify unexpected phenomena at the root of a tree and 
arrive at the causes by moving from the results toward 
the causes using a state transition model. The other is 
an analysis method in which engineers specify an 
information flow which assigns failure at the root of a 
tree and arrives at the causes by moving from the 
destination toward the sources in an information 
communication model. 
FMEA is used to analyze the failures that occur as a 
result of problems with the components in a bottom-up 
manner. In the conceptual model, we show two bottom-
up analyses similar to FMEA. One of these is an 
analysis method where engineers specify abnormal 
states of a component, instead of the problems with the 
component, at the root of the tree and then analyze the 
failures that occur as a result of combining with other 
states of the component and/or events using a state 
transition model. The second is an analysis method 
where engineers specify abnormal states of the 
component or failure carrier at the root of a tree and 
analyze the failures that occur as a result of combining 
with other information in an information 
communication model. 
HAZOP was originally used for analyzing the safety 
of plants, and assumes deviational phenomena that 
have a negative impact on the plant. In the conceptual 
model, the analysis process relies on the analysis of 
deviational phenomena as in HAZOP. Engineers expect 
the failure of carriers, abnormal states of components, 
and abnormal states caused by the deviation of carrier, 
state of component or event. 
 
3.2. Combining an IFD with an Analysis 
Matrix 
 
In this section, we discuss combining an IFD with 
an Analysis Matrix, which requires two issues to be 
considered. The first of these involves matching the 
concepts of the ESIM and an IFD to avoid repetition of 
concepts used in both the IFD and ESIM. This includes 
three topics. First, we explain how to describe a failure 
scenario. In an IFD, a failure scenario is depicted by 
information flow. On the other hand, in the ESIM, a 
failure scenario is described by phenomena. To enable 
non-expert engineers to deal with failure scenarios, we 
describe a failure scenario using information flow. 
Next, we explain the relationship between devices in an 
IFD and components in ESIM. We treat these concepts 
as one in the enhanced ESIM because they represent 
the same thing. Finally, we explain the relationship 
between the set of concepts, carriers and information  
 
Fig. 4.  A procedure in the enhanced ESIM
flow in an IFD and the communication contents in the 
ESIM. To enable non-expert engineers to deal with 
failure scenarios, we choose the solution that allows 
engineers to describe a more detailed failure scenario. 
A deviation of communication content in the ESIM is 
the same as recognizing a wrong meaning at a 
destination component because of deviation of the 
carrier in an IFD. Therefore, we use the concept of 
information flow and carrier in the enhanced ESIM. 
The second consideration is the analysis procedure 
and role assignment. Fig. 4 shows an analysis 
procedure in the enhanced ESIM using an IFD and an 
Analysis Matrix. To allow the analysis to be led by an 
expert engineer, this procedure is based on the ESIM 
procedure. When the analysis process reaches the end 
of this procedure, we obtain failure scenarios and 
feedback for software engineers. Furthermore, we 
assign the roles for each process to expert or non-
expert engineers as shown in Fig. 4. This assignment is 
based on the requirements shown in Section 2.3. 
 
3.3. Application example 
 
We show an example of the description of a failure 
scenario using an IFD and Analysis Matrix. The failure 
scenario is constructed from the sample specifications 
for an electric kettle. The kettle is equipped with a 
water sensor that senses the water level. If the sensor 
detects the filled water state, it turns off the heating 
element to prevent the boiling water from overflowing. 
When a user supplies water to the kettle, a thermistor 
senses the falling temperature, and this event turns on 
the heating element, which in time causes the kettle to 
enter the boiling water state. However, there is the 
possibility of an unexpected event happening, such as 
something tipping the kettle. Depending on the angle of  
the kettle, the filled water sensor may not recognize 
that the actual water level has reached the danger point, 
and the heating element remains in the state of 
“boiling”. Ultimately, the boiling water overflows  and 
may burn the user. 
In Fig. 1, we indicate the failure scenario by 
attaching numerical comments, e.g. (1), (2), (3), etc.. In 
Fig. 2, we show the same failure scenario. If we 
compare both descriptions, we find that the ESIM 
omits the detail of the failure scenario. The detail 
corresponding to (2), (3), (5), (7), (8), (9), (11), (12) 
and (13) in Fig. 1 is not present in Fig. 2. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
This section discusses the enhancement to the ESIM 
by combining an IFD and an Analysis Matrix. 
 
4.1. Effect of enhancing the ESIM 
 
To confirm the effects of this enhancement, we 
devised a description experiment using an IFD and 
based on the results of the ESIM. The target embedded 
system is implemented as a new product in the C 
programming language. During the development of this 
product, an expert engineer applied the ESIM to 
analyze failure scenarios. The expert engineer referred 
the requirements specification of the product for 
analysis. Applying the ESIM resulted in the expert 
engineer finding 44 failure scenarios in 32 hours. We 
gave 9 of these failure scenarios to testers to describe 
using IFDs. The testers were 3 students who had no 
development experience of the embedded software. In 
the experiment, the testers were allowed to question us 
freely. We recorded their questions, and analyzed the 
content. Ultimately, the testers were able to describe 
each of the scenarios using an IFD. The results of our 
analysis are as follows: 
• The method of mapping from a description of a 
failure scenario given in natural language to an IFD 
is useful for non-expert engineers. 
• It was difficult for the non-expert engineers to 
distinguish the control information and input 
information in a PD. 
• Some of the non-expert engineers were not 
sufficiently able to distinguish between information 
process and information flow. 
To assist testers with respect to the above-
mentioned points, an expert engineer was available to 
support them in all the non-expert engineer’s processes 
specified in Fig. 4. We expect that the effect of an 
actual application of this method in companies would 
result in the expert engineer’s load being reduced since 
the non-expert engineers would be more 
knowledgeable about embedded software than the 
testers in this experiment. 
 
4.2. Future work 
 
In this paper, we have proposed an enhancement to 
the ESIM by combining an IFD and an Analysis Matrix 
and have predicted the effect of this enhancement. In 
the future, we aim to confirm the effectiveness of the 
enhanced ESIM quantitatively by experimenting with 
real applications. Thereafter, we aim to reduce the cost 
of application of the enhanced ESIM by formalizing 
the analysis processes which are done by expert 
engineers in this paper. There are two future works. 
One of these is the formalization of the analysis method 
by applying qualitative reasoning with concepts of 
states provided by an Analysis Matrix and constraints 
given by an IFD. This formalization will lead to the 
formalization of knowledge about unexpected obstacles 
owned by expert engineers. Furthermore, the 
development of a knowledge base about unexpected 
obstacles will also be undertaken. The knowledge base 
is expected to be connected with CASE tools. Other 
future work will focus on the character of an IFD as a 
directed graph. Based on this, we will study the 
application of the techniques of graph analysis to 
analyze loss, connections and loops which provide 
feedback [5]. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has proposed an enhancement to the 
ESIM by combining an IFD and an Analysis Matrix. In 
this enhancement, we considered the following three 
issues: establishing the conceptual model, defining the 
analysis procedure, and assigning the roles of expert 
and non-expert engineers. Furthermore, we have 
predicted the effectiveness of this enhancement by 
carrying out a description experiment using an IFD. 
In the future, we aim to confirm the effectiveness of 
the enhanced ESIM quantitatively by experimenting 
with real applications. We will also study the 
formalization of the analysis method by applying 
qualitative reasoning theory. 
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